We report results from a survey experiment aimed at testing whether providing information on the national public expenditure to the taxpayers and whether involving them in the process of allocating tax revenues over public goods in ‡uence the level of the adequate tax rate -the fraction of income that individuals consider adequate to pay as taxes. We …nd that providing information on public expenditure does not in ‡uence the level of the adequate tax rate. On the contrary, the level of the adequate tax rate substantially increases when taxpayers can get to choose the public goods to …nance through their taxation JEL classi…cation: H24, H50, D31.
Introduction
In 2007, during a national TV program, the Italian …nance minister, Tommaso PadoaSchioppa notoriously claimed that "we should have the courage to say that taxes are a beautiful thing, a very civilized way for everyone to contribute in essential areas like education, safety, healthcare and the environment."
1 Indeed, in line with PadoaSchioppa's claim, citizens should perceive taxes as bene…cial when used to …nance fundamental public goods that advantage everyone in the community. Nevertheless, taxpayers often fail to recognize the positive aspects of taxes, exhibiting strong dissatisfaction with taxation. Reasons triggering such a negative mood can be at least twofold.
First, taxpayers may be unaware of how the government uses their taxes, what public goods it …nances and in which proportions. The absence of such knowledge may induce taxpayers to perceive taxes as an exogenous deadweight loss. According to several recent studies, providing information about government spending may increase the public acceptability of the taxes (Kallbekken and Aasen, 2010, Beuermann and Santarius, 2006, Klok et al., 2006) . Moreover, informing the taxpayers about the (social) bene…ts of tax payments can stimulate taxpayers'cooperative attitude towards the state and can signi…cantly reduce tax evasion (Holler et al., 2008) .
Second, even in cases in which information is not an issue, the existence of a mismatch between citizens'priorities and the choices of the government can make taxpayers perceive the tax burden as an ine¢ cient and inadequately high sacri…ce. An experimental study by Alm et al. (1993) illustrates that compliance with taxes is low when taxpayers do not value how the government uses …scal revenues. When the public expenditure is exogenously imposed, tax evasion results to be higher than in a context in which the public expenditure is endogenously chosen by the taxpayers. By implementing a "real donation" experiment in which subjects can give money either to a government agency or to a private charity involved in the same social projects, Li et al. (2011) identify the elements that make private charities more attractive for charitable donations. The authors conclude that taxpayers'antipathy towards taxation may be due to lack of control over the use of resources or coercion.
We present results of a survey experiment aimed at studying whether providing information on the national public expenditure to the tax payers and involving them in the process of allocating tax revenues over public goods a¤ect the adequate tax ratethe proportion of income that taxpayers consider adequate (acceptable) to pay as taxes. Although, surprisingly understudied by economists, 2 the potential bene…ts of involving taxpayers in the decision process of allocating tax revenues over public goods is getting increasing support in the popular press, as it is conjectured that tax choice will increase social acceptance of taxation. 3 We show, that when taxpayers are required to express their preferences on how they would allocate tax revenues over the main functional items of the public expenditure, they report substantially higher adequate tax rates relative to a situation with no tax choice. On the contrary, providing solely information on public expenditure to the taxpayers does not in ‡uence the level of the adequate tax rate. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the design of the survey experiment. Section 3 depicts the results. Section 4 concludes the paper.
The Survey Experiment

The Design
We administer a survey experiment to assess whether providing information on the national public expenditure and eliciting preferences on how to allocate tax revenues across functional items of the government in ‡uence the proportion of income that taxpayers perceive as adequate to pay in the form of taxes. There are relevant methodological issues that justify our design choice. First, like laboratory studies, survey experiments allow researchers to identify causal relationships between the treatment stimulus and subjects' actual choice. Second, the possibility of both using a concrete, context-speci…c language and avoiding arti…cial environments (such as the lab) make the survey experiment an adequate instrument to investigate into our real-world research question. . In all treatments, subjects living in Italy are invited to take part in an online questionnaire that is composed of two parts. The …rst part, kept constant across treatments, includes questions about the demographic and socio-economic conditions of the respondents. The second part of the questionnaire focuses on subjects' perception of the tax burden and represents our treatment variable. In particular, subjects in N I&N T C are asked to state the income tax rate that they consider as adequate to pay in order to …nance the Italian public expenditure. Subjects are required to give an answer that is included between 0 and 100 percent. The only di¤erence between N I&N T C and I&N T C is that, before stating the tax rate, subjects in I&N T C are presented with the 10 …rst level COF OG components of the Italian public expenditure ranked in descending order. 5 Apart from the labels, no other information on the 10 items (such as their relative size in terms of overall public expenditure) is provided. Thus, by comparing responses in N I&N T C with those in I&N T C, we are able to assess the e¤ects of information about the public expenditure on subjects'perception of the adequate tax rate. Finally, the questionnaire section dealing with subjects'perception of the adequate tax rate in I&T C is split into two consecutive tasks. First, subjects are presented with the same list of functional items used in I&N T C and, for each item, are asked to state the income tax rate that they consider as adequate to …nance that speci…c component. The stated percentages are required to be included between 0 and 100 percent and their sum not to exceed 100 percent. Once completed the …rst task, subjects are asked, as in the other two treatments, to report the adequate tax rate to …nance the (overall) Italian public expenditure. Thus, by comparing responses in I&N T C with those in the second task of I&T C, we are able to assess how tax choice in ‡uences the level of the adequate tax rate, net of the e¤ects of information on the main functional items of the Italian public expenditure.
After 15 days from the …rst phase of the survey experiment, participants in N I&N T C and I&N T C are unexpectedly invited to take part in the tax perception questionnaire used in I&T C. This experimental feature provides within-subject evidence of the e¤ects of choosing how to use taxes on the adequate tax rate.
Procedures
The survey experiment took place between May and July 2013 and was administered by using Qualtrics (http://www.qualtrics.com/). Subjects, mainly students of economics from three di¤erent universities in North Italy, 6 were recruited by email after advertizing the experiment through Facebook university groups. Once agreed to participate in the study, each subject was randomly and anonimously assigned to (only) one of the three di¤erent treatments. In order to guarantee anonimity and correctly match the responses across the two phases of N I&N T C and I&N T C, subjects were required to provide the …rst 6 digits of their personal (16 alpha-numeric character) tax code.
Experimental Results
Overall, 282 subjects took part in the survey experiment: 105 participated in N I&N T C, 102 in I&N T C and 75 in I&T C. As explained above, subjects in N I&N T C and I&N T C were also invited to take part in the second phase of the experiment. In particular, we collected data concerning the second phase from 48 out of 105 subjects in N I&N T C and from 43 out of 102 subjects in I&N T C. The following table shows some sociodemographic characteristics of participants in the three treatments:
[ Table 1 about here]
As reported by the previous table, we detect di¤erences in the distributions of gender ( 2 (2) = 16:482; p < 0:001) and professional status ( 2 (6) = 20:339; p < 0:010) across the three treatments. In order to properly account for these di¤erences, we will present results of both non-parametric tests and parametric regressions that explicitly control for 6 Bocconi University in Milan, University of Varese-Insubria, and University of Padova. 4 subjective characteristics of respondents. The following …gure shows the frequency of the stated adequate tax rates in the …rst phase of the three treatments.
[ Figure 1 about here] Figure 1 suggests that the proportion of subjects reporting an adequate tax rate greater than 30% is 58% in I&T C, 31% in I&N T C and 27% in N I&N T C. According to a proportion test, both the di¤erence between I&T C and N I&N T C and the di¤erence between I&T C and I&N T C are signi…cant (for the former comparison, 2 (1) = 4:271, p = 0:039; for the latter comparison, 2 (1) = 2:721, p = 0:099). Table 2 reports the (mean) adequate tax rates in the three treatments and in the two phases of N I&N T C and I&N T C.
[ Table 2 about here]
In order to assess di¤erences in the adequate tax rates across treatments and phases, Table 3 reports results of econometric models that control for the socio-demographic characteristics of the participants.
[ Table 3 about here]
As a …rst step, we focus on the adequate tax rates stated by subjects in the …rst phase. We can reject the null hypothesis of equality of the adequate tax rates across treatments (according to a Kruskal-Wallis test, 2 (2) = 7:368, p = 0:025). In particular, as revealed by the positive and highly signi…cant coe¢ cient of the treatment dummy in the …rst regression in Table 3 , subjects in I&T C report signi…cantly higher adequate tax rates than in the other two treatments (for the di¤erence between the coe¢ cients of I&T C and I&N T C, F (1; 275) = 4:74, p = 0:030). These results are also con…rmed by non-parametric tests. According to a Mann-Whitney U test, the mean adequate tax rate in I&T C is higher than those in I&N T C (W = 3203, p = 0:061) and N I&N T C (W = 3009:5, p = 0:007), while no signi…cant di¤erence is detected by comparing I&N T C and N I&N T C (W = 5028, p = 0:443).
Overall, the abovementioned evidence suggests that providing information on the Italian public expenditure does not in ‡uence the tax rate that subjects consider as adequate to pay in order to …nance the public expenditure. On the contrary, the reported adequate tax rate substantially increases when subjects express their preferences on how to allocate their taxes over the …scal domains. 7 Sometimes "the whole is less than the sum of its parts" (Van Boven and Epley, 2003). This phenomenon is known as "unpacking e¤ect" (Rottenstreich and Tversky, 1997) and has been observed in several domains, including voluntary contributions to public goods (Bernasconi et al. 2009 ). We detect a similar e¤ect in our experiment. Indeed, by looking at the …rst phase of I&T C, we …nd that the sum of the percentages stated in the …rst task is signi…cantly higher than the adequate tax rate reported in the second task (Wilcoxon Sign-Rank test, V = 220, p = 0:000). We also observe similar results in the second phase of the other two treatments, albeit di¤erences are statistically non-signi…cant (Wilcoxon Sign-Rank test: V = 306:5, p = 0:255 in N I&N T C; V = 99, p = 0:148 in I&N T C).
In order to assess within-subject e¤ects of tax choice on the adequate tax rates in I&N T C and N I&N T C, the second and the third columns of Table 3 show results of panel regressions that use the two phases of the experiment as longitudinal dimensions. In line with the previous evidence, we …nd that subjects increase the reported adequate tax rates between the two phases, with the e¤ect being marginally stronger in I&N T C (as highlighted by the coe¢ cient of the interaction term P h:2: I&N T C). Again, these …ndings are supported by non-parametric tests. A Wilcoxon Sign-Rank test con…rms that subjects respond to the tax choice manipulation by signi…cantly increasing the reported adequate tax rates in both N I&N T C (V = 222; p = 0:004) and I&N T C (V = 68; p = 0:000). As discussed in the introduction, the mismatch between taxpayers' preferences and government priorities represents a reasonable explanation of the positive e¤ects of the tax choice manipulation on the adequate tax rate. In order to shed light on this aspect, as …nal step, we turn to subjects'reported percentages for the 10 functional items of the Italian public expenditure. Figure 2 pools subjects'stated percentages in the …rst phase of I&T C and in the second phase of N I&N T C and I&N T C 9 and compares them with the 2011 Italian public expenditure (according to the COF OG scale).
[ Figure 2 about here]
As shown by the …gure, there are remarkable discrepancies between the ranking produced according to subjects'choices in our experiment and that built according to the (real) public expenditure of the government. While the major functional items of the 2011 Italian public expenditure were social protection and general public services (17:86% and 19:90%, respectively), subjects in the experiment attach the highest weights to education and the health system (41:02% and 17:27%, respectively). Moreover, as a Kendall rank coe¢ cient test suggests, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of independence between the ranking implied by subjects' choices and that built according to the Italian public expenditure (z = 1:257, p = 0:209).
Conclusion
"When it comes tax time or when a person …rst signs on for a new job, the government should let them as an individual decide where they want the money deducted from their paychecks for taxes to go. [...] Let the individuals decide -and, once they decide, make sure that their money gets to the place that they have rightfully chosen" (Forbes,  2012) . 10 The present paper provides supporting evidence in favor of the previous claim as it shows that involving taxpayers in the decision of allocating tax revenues over the main functional items of the public expenditure substantially increases the proportion of the income taxpayers perceive adequate (acceptable) to pay in the form of taxes.
Our results inform the literature on tax evasion that "non-classical" interventions aimed at sensibilizing and motivating taxpayers can be as important as standard interventions in the form of increased penalty rate and audit probability (e.g. Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) . Indeed, the more taxation is perceived as acceptable and socially relevant, the more evading is likely to impose substantial psychological costs (in the form of guilt and shame; see Erard and Feinstein, 1994) on the taxpayer and the higher the incentive to comply with taxes will be (see Hashimzade et al. 2012 , Andreoni et al. 1998 for excellent reviews on psychological costs of tax evasion). In a recent experimental study based on a standard tax evasion setting, Djawadi and Fahr (2013) …nd that tax choice enhances tax compliance. The authors explain their …ndings in terms of enhanced trust towards the government, though direct quantitative evidence on enhanced trust (and how it is measured) is missing from the analysis. We provide alternative explanation for the …ndings of Djawadi and Fahr (2013) as, stemming from our paper, we show that tax choice increases the perceived adequacy (acceptability) of the tax burden. Note. Socio-demographic characteristics of subjects in the three treatments of the survey experiment. Notes. The …rst column includes results from a OLS model while the second and the third columns show results from GLS random-e¤ects models (robust standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variable: adequate tax rates reported by subjects. Independent variables: Male, Student, White Collar, Unemployed -Dummies = 1 if the respondent is male, student, white collar and unemployed, respectively, = 0 o/w; I&NTC, I&TC -Treatment dummies = 1 in I&NTC and I&TC, respectively, = 0 o/w; Ph.2. -dummy = 1 in the second phase of the survey experiment, = 0 o/w; Ph.2.*I&NTC -interaction term. Signi…cance levels. * p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1%.
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As follows, we report the questions used in the three treatments to elicit the adequate tax rate. The questions were originally written in Italian.
N I&N T C (Phase 1)
Overall, what percentage of your income do you think is adequate to pay as taxes to …nance the Italian Public Expenditure? (between 0 and 100%): ... %
I&N T C (Phase 1)
In Italy, taxes are used to …nance the following components of the Public Expenditure (ranked in decreasing order in terms of incidence on the Public Budget):
1 a) The percentage of each component has to be included between 0 and 100%; b) The sum of the percentages cannot exceed 100%.
